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The PROMETHEUS Payment® model is explicitly designed 
to pay providers to deliver what science says patients should receive for their specific 
constellation of clinical problems associated with a condition. The maximum payment 
amount for a provider is based upon an Evidence-informed Case Rate® (ECR). Whether 
the provider will realize the full potential for payment depends on the scores that 
provider earns under the model’s comprehensive scorecard. To create a very clear 
incentive for clinical collaboration, the final scores depend 70% on what the provider 
does and 30% on what every other provider treating that patient for that condition has 
done—whether under the ECR or not.2 The scoring system is an essential element 
of what makes the PROMETHEUS Payment® model different from other payment 
systems as well as different from typical pay-for-performance models, even though it 
uses many of the same measures that pay-for-performance programs use today. 
The workings of the PROMETHEUS® scorecard have not been fleshed out until 
relatively recently. Now it is time to explain the theory of the scoring and its 
development. This paper describes how we got to the current scoring approach, the 
principles of scoring, the sources of the measures, how scores are calculated, and 
the impact of the scores on payment. It should be noted, however, that as with much 
of the conceptual work on PROMETHEUS Payment®, we expect that multiple aspects 
of the scoring will be refined as we implement the program in pilot sites and with 
other collaborators. Still further, it is beyond the scope of this first iteration to explain 
all the possible permutations in scoring. The purpose of this paper is to introduce and 
elucidate the basics of scoring. So, let’s get started.
  
1 This paper assumes a basic familiarity with the payment model. For information about the PROMETHEUS Payment® 
model and how case rates themselves are constructed, go to www.prometheuspayment.org to review the publications 
there as well as FAQs.
2 If a patient receives care from a provider for the same condition, but that provider is not being paid under the PROMETHEUS 
Payment model, those monies will be subtracted from the budget available to pay all the providers.
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The Conceptual Evolution
When the Design Team first confronted how to make the payment model attractive to 
plans, one of the considerations was providing for some way to assure that care which 
had been contracted for, was actually delivered—a score to demonstrate performance. 
The scores would also serve as a basis to report provider performance to patients, other 
providers, plans and anyone else with an interest, not only to fulfill the goal of trans-
parency3, but also to provide actionable information on which providers could improve 
their care delivery and patients could choose good performing providers.  
To attract providers, as well as plans, there was also the issue of admin-
istrative burden reduction. Since the clinical practice guidelines which 
form the basis for the ECR, encompass the rendering of a particular com-
bination of services, it would no longer be necessary, in this model, to 
engage in post-service audits to assure that specific and discrete services 
were authorized in advance or had been rendered, or visits performed 
at specific levels.4 If we could develop a way to capture whether provid-
ers were producing proper outcomes for patients based on measured 
performance even if physicians still have to file claims, much of the 
administrative burdens for providers as well as plans would dissipate. In 
addition, the system would offer far greater flexibility to providers in the 
organization and delivery of care. 
The payment amounts reflect what science dictates. If providers use 
innovative approaches to accomplish condition-specific improved out-
comes, so much the better. In other words, with a clinical practice guideline as the 
foundation upon which payment is based, there would be no need to prior authorize 
services, engage in concurrent review, conduct post-payment audits, evaluate the level of 
visit which had been provided, review the medical necessity of the laboratory services 
ordered, or subject the drug prescriptions to pharmacy benefit review as in or out of 
formulary. The provider’s scores would determine whether the care was good, even if 
the delivery was not explicitly what was set forth as the basis for the payment amount. 
As we will see in the discussion of the payment impacts, efficiency alone does not drive 
payment increases: clinical quality, including appropriate flexibility in delivering care, 
has more of an effect on the actual payment providers will receive.
That said, though, we expected it was also likely that not all providers would produce 
optimal performance. And some, despite their best efforts, might not achieve thresh-
old levels of quality. To confront that dilemma, we needed a way to avoid rewarding 
  
3 For a list of the principal tenets of the PROMETHEUS Payment® model see http://www.prometheuspayment.org/mission/tenets.htm
4 For an elucidation of the many ways the PROMETHEUS Payment® model explicitly departs from the post-service inspection and audit 
model of Medicare, see Gosfield, “Getting The Team Paid: How Medicare Physician Payment Policies Impede Quality”, HEALTH LAW 
HANDBOOK (2009 ed.) (in press) http://gosfield.com/PDF/Gosfield.Getting%20the%20Team%20Paid.pdf
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inadequate care while assuring that there would be enough incentive to encourage the 
move to more science-based care. We initially thought that a 10% withhold on chronic 
care payment and a 20% withhold from the maximum amount an acute care provider 
might be paid would safeguard both against providers stinting on services, as well as 
against plans paying for services never rendered. As the design of the model evolved, 
though, while the withhold remained attractive, the differentiation between chronic and 
acute care proved unrealistic. We then posited that withholds of 10% for physicians and 
20% for hospitals and other institutional providers might be a more workable approach. 
Once, however, we discovered the considerable funds available in the Potentially Avoid-
able Complications (PACs) Pools,5 it became obvious that these funds could serve as the 
incentive payment in the ECR, at least until care had been so improved that there was 
less money in the PAC Pools than our initially conceived withhold funds. Because pro-
viders would be paid as they rendered care, these PAC Pool funds would be available as 
a “bonus” payment once the provider demonstrated having achieved a minimal quality 
threshold, and then would be paid pro rata in accordance with the scores.
Principles of Scoring
In the same way that the Design Team would not be in the business of creating the 
guidelines as the foundation for the ECRs, the Design Team was not going to go into the 
business of creating new measures. There are already many measures in the system.6 
Focusing on structure, process and outcomes, we would leverage existing measurement 
and reporting efforts such as for hospitals, from the Joint Commission ORYX program 
and Leapfrog measures, CMS measures for hospitals and physicians, and Bridges to Ex-
cellence (BTE) measures for physicians. Further, since we are using Evidence-informed 
Case Rates®, we need to rely primarily on already validated measures which reflect that 
evidence. Patient experience of care (as well as patient assessment of functional health 
status, wherever possible) would be a critical component of scores, although that data 
would have to come from other sources still. We would utilize the already adopted prin-
ciples of the Ambulatory Quality Alliance7 and Hospital Quality Alliance8.
Based on best practices in scorecard design9, the Design Team determined that the 
scorecard as applied should (1) reward both threshold performance as well as improve-
ment from prior performance; (2) minimize the potential for cherry-picking patients to 
  
5 For an understanding of how the PAC Pools are derived and applied, see Gosfield, “Making PROMETHEUS Payment Rates Real: 
Ya’ Gotta’ Start Somewhere”, (June 2008), http://www.prometheuspayment.org/publications/pdf/MakingItReal-Final.pdf
6 Gosfield, “The Performance Measures Ball: Too Many Tunes, Too Many Dancers?”, HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, (2005 ed.) West, 
A Thomson Company, pp., 227-283 http://gosfield.com/PDF/Ch4Gosfield.pdf. 
7 http://www.aqaalliance.org/
8 http://www.hospitalqualityalliance.org
9 Rosenthal and Dudley: “Pay-for-performance: A Decision Guide for Employers”, AHRQ,  April 2006, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/
p4pguide.htm 
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enhance scores (by rejecting sicker patients); and (3) create stratified comparisons to 
provide appropriate comparisons for providers with disproportionate shares of un- or 
under-insured patients. This last principle became especially important when we un-
derstood that it would be both impossible at the outset, as well as unfair in the scoring, 
to take into account only those patients whose care was paid for by ECRs. Therefore, 
providers are scored on all their patients receiving care for the conditions at issue. 
Similarly, we did not want the system to permit mediocre performance on one ECR 
where budgets were exceeded, with rewards still paid on others. The financial effect 
would have to be such that across ECRs the provider was in a positive financial position 
before any incentive would be paid. But the most critical issue was that no incentive 
payment would be made unless, across ECRs, the provider achieved a quality threshold; 
in other words a hospital could not do spectacularly well on a few hips and knees, 
and not perform to the threshold on acute myocardial infarction cases and expect to 
receive any payout from the PAC Pools. We will see below how these principles are 
implemented.
The PROMETHEUS® Engine takes CMS 1500s and UB-94s and allocates 
the services rendered to all providers treating patients under ECRs as 
being either typical or associated to a Potentially Avoidable Complica-
tion (PAC)10. That data is reported to BTE which manages the scorecard. 
Maintaining this function within the PROMETHEUS Payment® system 
has the dual effect of both lowering administrative burden to plans and 
enhancing the credibility of the data, since there is no advantage or dis-
advantage to the data manager from the scores themselves.11
Measures
In selecting measures that would track to the specific ECR conditions, 
the Design Team was mindful of the challenge to not contribute further 
to administrative burden. Therefore, measures would have to be those already in use by 
some other source, and the reporting of them would be limited and mostly self-reported. 
The dilemma of gleaning data directly from medical records, which is expensive, time 
consuming, burdensome to physicians and very difficult in an era when electronic re-
cords are not universally available, was the first challenge as to what would be useful 
as measures. The measures would have to be relatively easily reported by providers. 
It should be noted, as well though, that claims data—that data submitted to the PRO-
METHEUS Engine by all the providers working on the ECR—will provide the basis to 
judge efficiency, and who rendered what services. The number of patients treated by 
  
10 Again, for the construction of ECRs and PACs, see n5.
11 Providers have long decried that plans manipulate performance data for their own financial ends.
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each provider and paid under each ECR also weights the scores. As we show in Table 
1 (page 8) that data feeds into the Scorecard calculations as well. The claims data also 
produces the complication rate determined in accordance with the characterization of 
the ‘potentially avoidable complications.’ This data will be taken into account in the 
scoring process, too. 
Because many of the chronic conditions addressed in the ECRs are 
being addressed by others as well, finding measures to score physi-
cians on those conditions was not so difficult. Bridges to Excellence, 
already serving as the administrator of PROMETHEUS Payment®, 
Inc., activities, was in the business of scoring physicians for perfor-
mance on cardiac care and diabetes, among other conditions For 
coronary artery disease, heart failure, asthma, and chronic obstruc-
tive pulmonary disease, the NCQA measures already in use for car-
diac care were the beginning, with additions of condition-specific 
measures from CMS’s Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI), 
the American Medical Association Physician Consortium for Perfor-
mance Improvement (PCPI), and well-established guidelines. 
Among the measures selected are those addressing structure (e.g., 
health information technology infrastructure, use of registries), 
process (e.g. angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker 
therapy (ACEI/ARB) in heart failure, lung function testing in asthma) and outcomes 
(e.g. LDL levels, oxygen saturation).12 Some of the measures—like blood pressure, low 
density lipoprotein (LDL), use of diuretics, and smoking cessation—are relevant to mul-
tiple conditions, so they are, in effect, scored more than once, as relevant to each ECR 
separately.  
There is no national program for the production or collection of physician patient satisfac-
tion data or data on patient experience of physician care. As the program is implemented 
in local settings, there may well be regional or local programs that can provide such in-
formation. For example, in Massachusetts, there is a program in which patient experience 
of care is being systematically collected for all physician groups at the practice level.13
For hospitals, condition-specific inpatient measures were less available. For acute 
myocardial infarction and CABG, Leapfrog and CMS already had measures in use. For 
bariatric surgery there were limited Leapfrog measures. For knee and hip replacements, 
there was nothing condition-specific; but all of the care could be measured by hospital-
wide scores on, for example, surgical infections, and other ORYX data as reported to 
the Joint Commission.
  
12 For all the chronic care measures by ECR see www.prometheuspayment.org/scorecard/index.htm 
13 see http://www.mhqp.org/quality/pes/pesMASumm.asp?nav=031600
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By contrast, for data on hospital-based patient experience of care, there is the HCAHPS 
program. The federal government sponsors this survey of the patient assessment of care 
which is described as follows:
The HCAHPS survey is composed of 27 items: 18 substantive items that encom-
pass critical aspects of the hospital experience (communication with doctors, 
communication with nurses, responsiveness of hospital staff, cleanliness and 
quietness of hospital environment, pain management, communication about 
medicines, discharge information, overall rating of hospital, and recommenda-
tion of hospital); four items to skip patients to appropriate questions; three 
items to adjust for the mix of patients across hospitals; and two items to support 
congressionally-mandated reports.14  
These measures tend to demonstrate overall quality performance; although, over time, 
we would hope the industry would move toward the parsimonious addition of more 
specific, salient measures for each of the ECR conditions.
Weighting and Calculations
The weighting of the measures either tracks closely to the NCQA-BTE weighting, or has 
been created with input from physicians. For example, the COPD measure weights were 
developed by a panel of physician leaders from the Cleveland Clinic, Duke and National 
Jewish Hospital. Intermediate outcomes measures such as hemoglobin A1c tend to be 
weighted higher than process scores. Typically, the model assigns 60% or more of all 
potential points for a set of condition-specific measures to intermediate outcomes and 
the balance to process. This calculation is intended to give importance to what happens 
to the patient as opposed to checklists of fragmented processes. Since following good 
clinical practice guidelines will tend to produce the outcomes that are the evidence 
which support the guideline, the Design Team expects good concordance between 
the care called for in the guidelines driving the ECR budget and good outcomes. That 
is the whole point of the model. Still, if providers achieve good outcomes without 
providing every scintilla of what is in the guidelines, the design allows greater flexibility 
for providers if that flexibility produces good results for patients.  
For each measurement set (e.g. Diabetes Care) each measure is assigned available point 
limits. The actual points awarded for that measure are calculated by counting the results 
of the physician’s patients’ compliance with that measure. The number of patients with 
the condition who meet the measure is the numerator. The denominator is the universe 
of patients with that condition for that provider during the scoring period.15 For measures 
  
14 http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hospitalqualityinits/30_hospitalHCAHPS.asp
15 For these and all scoring purposes, “a provider” may be a single physician, a single specialty, a large multi-specialty group, a 
hospital, or a fully integrated delivery system, a PHO or whatever configurations providers present.  The “providers” who negotiate 
for PROMETHEUS Payment® to be made by the plan are the locums for scoring as well.  The level at which the provider is paid is the 
level for scoring.
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of poor control, a low numerator is good and produces the obverse result. For example, 
if out of 100 diabetics only 10 have poor scores, the remaining 90% did well and deter-
mine the point value. The table below illustrates how the scoring works:
By using a calculation of the numerator and denominator, per physician, per patient, per 
condition, per scoring period, physicians can increase their scores with every additional 
patient whose care is consistent with good standards. A practice is scored on all the 
condition-specific measure sets that correspond to the ECRs that they are managing. As 
the PROMETHEUS Payment® model is first implemented, physicians can be scored on 
up to six chronic care ECRs. Their total score across all those measures will determine 
their ultimate maximum payment. To avoid paying from the PAC Pools where the scores 
are widely disparate across ECRs, the number of patients treated under each ECR (in 
the table below stated as a percentage of the universe of patients treated under all the 
chronic ECRs) determines the weighted result. Weighting the results offers yet another 
protection against a provider neglecting one condition over others, but still gives credit 
for improvement without perfection. Then, all the weighted scores are added to deter-
mine if the baseline quality threshold has been met.
Diabetes Care
Clinical Measures Points per  
Measure
Num/Den  
Result
Points Awarded 
(points per measure x 
Num/Dem result)
  Poor control measures
  HgBA1c Control 15 89.26% 13.39
  Blood Pressure Control 15 79.87% 11.98
  LDL Control 10 66.67% 6.67
Superior control measures
  HgBA1c Superior Control 10 23.08% 2.31
  Blood Pressure Superior Control 10 41.03% 4.10
  LDL Superior Control 10 61.54% 6.15
Process measures
  Ophthalmologic Exam 10 60.26% 6.03
  Nephropathy Assessment 5 95.92% 4.80
  Podiatry Exam 5 76.83% 3.84
  Smoking Status and Cessation Advice and 
  Treatment
10 95.35% 9.53
Total 100 68.80
Table 1. Measure Set Scoring
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In Table 2, the simple unweighted sum of the scores for each clinical area is 396.90, which 
translates to a total score of 66.15 on a 100 scale (396.90/600=66.15). However, the patient 
volumes (stated as a percentage of all patients paid to that physician under ECRs) are 
weighted across the universe of all patients paid under ECRs, so the weighted “case-mix-
adjusted” score is 70.91. This weighting is only used to determine if any PAC Pool Funds 
will be paid. The actual payments for each ECR are as set forth in Table 4.
Let’s now assume that the physician who scored a 70.91 on his chronic care ECRs refers 
his patients with CAD to a hospital which scored a 63 on CABG as detailed below in 
Table 3. The physician’s final quality scorecard threshold would therefore be: 70.91 x 70% 
+ 63 x 30% = 68.54.16 
CABG Care
Points Per Measure Score Points Achieved
Outcomes 
     Leapfrog Survey Result
 
20
 
50%
 
10
Process 
     Leapfrog Survey Result 
     CMS Hospital Compare
 
10 
10
 
75% 
90%
 
7.5 
9
Volume 
     Leapfrog Survey Result
 
20
 
50%
 
10
Patient Safety/Surgical Infections 
     Leapfrog Survey Result 
     CMS Hospital Compare
 
10 
10
 
75% 
90%
 
7.5 
9
Patient Experience of Care 
     CMS Hospital Compare
 
20
 
50%
 
10
Total 100 63
Possible 
Points
Actual 
Points
% of  
Patients
Weighted Score 
(Actual points x % of patients)
COPD Care 100 91.05 40.0% 36.42
Hypertension Care 100 68.65 15.0% 10.30
Cardiac Care 100 74.90 7.5% 5.62
Diabetes Care 100 68.80 15.0% 10.32
Heart Failure Care 100 59.71 2.5% 1.49
Asthma Care 100 33.79 20.0% 6.76
Total 600 396.90 100% 70.91
Table 2. Quality Threshold Scoring
Table 3. Hospital Scoring
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Because the physician’s final score is greater than 50, our quality threshold, the physician 
will qualify for PAC Pool funds. The specific allocation of those funds is a simple award 
proportional to where the physician is situated on the scoring scale of 50 to 90 (above 
90, the physician automatically gets 100% of the incentives because the clinical value to 
patients to get 100% might be low and the effort to attain that level high and potentially 
distracting from more beneficial efforts). Following our current example, the physician 
would earn 46.35% of the eligible CAD PAC Pool funds (68.54 – 50 = 18.54; 90 – 50 = 
40; 18.54 ÷ 40 = 46.35%).
While this formula would be applied to each ECR, taking into account the performance 
of the respective hospital to which the physician referred for specific conditions, for the 
purposes of this paper, we will assume that he refers to the same hospital all the time, 
when patients need admissions, and that the hospital’s scores are the same for all the 
admissions. Since many of the measures for hospitals are systemwide at this time, that 
assumption is not necessarily wrong, either. But where physicians have choices among 
hospitals, and hospitals do better in some services than others, part of the point of the 
design is to encourage physicians to send their patients to those places where perfor-
mance is better for what the patient needs. None of this can happen without actionable 
data being available, which won’t be the case until the model has been in effect for at 
least a year. So we will apply the 46.35% rate across all of this physician’s ECRs. Let us 
now look at what that means in actual dollar terms.
Table 4 summarizes the results for the physician across each ECR. The first column rep-
resents how many of each patient he treated under that ECR. This hypothetical physician 
treats more patients with hypertension than anything else. The “total budget for typical” 
Type of ECR Number  
of ECRs
Total Budget  
for Typical
Total Budget 
for PAC
Total Actual 
for Typical
Total Actual 
for PAC
COPD 25 34,102 4,115 37,512 12,567
DM 50 185,611 64,309 152,201 32,649
CHF 10 55,098 43,210 57,046 42,876
Asthma 35 21,862 10,508 21,643 1,506
CAD 70 154,166 25,224 137,208 22,598
HTN 310 844,898 39,470 735,061 25,432
Totals 500 $1,295,736 $186,837 $1,140,670 $137,628
Variance $155,066 $49,209
Table 4. Payment Effects
  
16 In the fullness of time and implementation of the model, this 30% will also take into account the surgeons and other specialists 
treating the patient for the same condition; but the first iteration of the PROMETHEUS® Scorecard cannot do that yet.
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is the payor’s dollar amounts available to pay for an uncomplicated case. If a physician 
is more innovative and resourceful than most, he can make money here. This physician 
manages diabetes, coronary artery disease, and hypertension significantly better than 
the payor calculated from historical patterns, in accordance with the clinical practice 
guidelines and expert opinion. The physician may be using nurse practitioners to be 
involved with his patients more than others. He may have better educational programs 
to help patients comply with his prescribed regimens. He may use email interchanges 
or other health information technology to keep patients engaged but not in the office. 
None of these specific techniques will be visible in the data, but he will earn improved 
financial margins for those conditions from some kind of process improvement. That is 
the point of the incentives. 
There may be other factors at work, too, though. The primary 
distinction between the PROMETHEUS Payment® model and other 
episode-based payments is that under PROMETHEUS Payment®, 
the dollar amounts available to pay providers start with clinical 
practice guidelines and expert opinion as to what resources should 
be brought to bear to treat specific clinical conditions. But the scor-
ing system has been designed not to require physicians to rigidly 
adhere to a prescribed list of services which provide the basis for 
the rate calculations; rather physicians need flexibility in treating 
patients, particularly chronic patients. Many of these patients have 
related co-morbidities. Studies have shown that to require deliv-
ery of all the services set forth in multiple guidelines—like those 
for COPD and asthma, and hypertension—on a simple cumulative 
basis could harm patients, while needlessly increasing costs.17 So, 
this physician may have not provided some of the services contem-
plated by one ECR because they conflicted clinically with another. 
And, as a result, not all the monies allocated in the typical ECRs 
were utilized. This is clinically appropriate. As a result, if a physician leaves money on 
the table for his typical ECRs, he may have appropriately deviated from the guidelines 
but the quality score safeguards against his skimping on care. As to his performance on 
the other chronic conditions, he came in about as expected on asthma and was a little 
over budget on COPD and CHF. Together, his management style on typical ECRs gener-
ated an additional $155,066, just on the typical patients without complications.  
Now we look at the “Total Budget for PAC” which reflects the 50% of the prior year’s 
expenditures on potentially avoidable complications.18 The design expects that com-
plications will occur. In fact, the design provides an allocation for them. However, to 
the extent physicians can avoid complications, the more money they will make. This 
physician did extremely well in avoiding complications for asthma, did very well on 
avoiding complications of diabetes, did somewhat better than expected on CAD and 
  
17 Boyd, Darer, et al, “Clinical Practice Guidelines and Quality of Care for Older Patients With Multiple Comorbid Diseases”,  JAMA, Vol 
294, No.6, (Aug 10, 2005), pp. 716-724
The primary distinction... is that under 
PROMETHEUS Payment®, the dollar 
amounts available to pay providers 
start with clinical practice guidelines 
and expert opinion as to what re-
sources should be brought to bear to 
treat specific clinical conditions. 
12
PROMETHEUS PayMEnT®: WHaT’S THE ScORE?
hypertension, but really missed the mark on COPD. His treatment of CHF had slightly 
lower expenses of complications than budgeted These complications might represent 
hospitalizations for exacerbations, steeply increased drug expenses, patient compliance 
failures or simply patients at risk with poor family histories. We do not know from the 
data alone, but this type of information gives the physician a very clear direction on 
which to focus his attention in figuring out how to do better going forward.
Subtracting the total dollars actually spent on complications, from the total dollars bud-
geted for complications, even with the variances among the conditions, this physician 
generated another $49,209 in savings over what was budgeted in the ECR. This figure, 
combined with the savings on the typical cases provides a total pool of savings of 
$204,275 ($155,066 + $49,209). But this program is not about simple savings. If it were, 
there would be an incentive not to deliver to patients what they need. The design is not 
intended to be a pure gainsharing model. The application of the quality scores against 
the pool of savings is what distinguishes this model from other programs which are 
driven solely by cost savings. The quality scores are an essential component of the pro-
gram and, given the quality scores this physician achieved with his hospital partner, the 
physician would be paid an additional $94,681 ($204,275 * 46.35%). 
It is also important to note that if his hospital had performed better and scored better, he 
would have been paid more. If he had managed his patients with COPD as well as he 
is managing his asthmatics and hypertensives, he would have made more money. These 
figures give him actionable directions to improve care both on efficiency and quality. In 
addition, since most physicians (and hospitals) will not score in the 90s, there will be 
monies left in the PAC Pools. The balance of those incentive funds will be distributed to 
the top 25% of quality performers. Together, there are multiple bases on which provid-
ers can find common ground to improve care and do better financially. And those who 
do the best on quality, by comparison with others, stand to make even more money. 
This further incentivizes providers to do better with each additional patient as well as in 
comparison to their peers.
  
18 Again, the principles for these calculations are set forth in “Making PROMETHEUS Payment® Rates Real: Ya’ Gotta’ Start 
Somewhere.”  
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Effects
This earliest version of the scoring methodology is intended to lower administra-
tive burden to all and capture salient data on quality that will be meaningful to 
patients, employers, and health plans, and useful to providers. We have taken 
what is available today, and adapted it to the philosophy and purposes of the 
PROMETHEUS Payment® design as distinct from any other current payment 
programs. While the model shares the measures of some of the best pay for per-
formance programs, because the ECRs are constructed so differently from exist-
ing payment models, the significance of those measures is changed. The scoring 
supports financial incentives for appropriate compensation for the “quantum” of 
quality produced, better reimbursement for clinical collaboration which yields 
better scores, and flexibility in the techniques of care delivery. “Continuous 
scoring” rewards good care with each additional well-treated patient, and yields 
better results for providers who do better overall.
As the model is tested in pilot sites, like much in the PROMETHEUS Payment® 
model, we also will continuously refine our approach. As better condition- 
specific metrics become available, they will be parsimoniously added to the mix, 
substituting for today’s metrics which may not be ideal. We have 
much to learn from the application of the methodology, but, like 
the ECRs, we have to start somewhere to change healthcare with 
a better payment model. The PROMETHEUS Payment® model is a 
dynamic work in progress, and like the healthcare it is designed to 
improve, expects changes over time as well.
The PROMETHEUS Payment® 
model is a dynamic work in 
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it is designed to improve, expects 
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PROMETHEUS Payment®, Inc. is a not for profit corporation which has been created to steward  
the further development and implementation of the PROMETHEUS Payment model. 
PROMETHEUS Payment is specifically designed to: (1) improve quality (2) lower administrative 
burden (3) enhance transparency and (4) support a patient-centric and consumer driven 
environment, all while facilitating better clinical coordination throughout health care. 
By creating common clinical incentives for all parties, the likelihood of significant system reform 
is enhanced even though in the fullness of time PROMETHEUS Payment will not substitute for all 
fee for service and capitation. In the last analysis, PROMETHEUS Payment is intended to create a 
payment environment where doing the right things for the patient helps providers and insurers  
do well for themselves.
For more information on the PROMETHEUS Payment system, visit www.prometheuspayment.org.
